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ABSTRACT
Liability in tort and the regulation of
safety are considered as means of controlling accident risks
using the instrumentalist, economic method ofanalysis.
Four general determinants of the relative socialdesirabil-
ity of liability and regulation are first identified--
differencesin knowledge about risky activitiesas between a
social authority and private parties; thepossibility that
parties would not be able to pay fully for harm done; the
chance that they would not face suit for harmdone; and
administrative costs. On the basis of analysis of these
determinants, it is suggested that the choices observed to
be made between liability and regulationare, when broadly
viewed, socially rational: Notably, activities thatcreate
the risk of the typical tort and that are littleregulated
characteristically display features leading us tosay that
they ought to be controlled mainly by liability. And activ-
ities that are much regulated —-especiallyones involving
significant hazards to health or to the environment—-ought
to be directly constrained in importantways, taking into
account their usual features.
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I. Introduction
Liability in tort and regulation of safetyrepresent
two very different approaches forcontrolling activities
that create risks of harm.1 Theapproach of liability is
private in nature and works in a manner that is inessence
indirect, for behavior under it is not determinedby command
of a social authority but rather by thedeterrent of payment
of money damages should harm occur.Standards, prohibitions,
and other forms of safety regulation, incontrast, are
public in character and operate in principle inan immediate
way to alter behavior; they are requirements imposed on
behavior ex ante--before, or at leastindependent of, the
actual occurrence of harm.
It is apparent that these two means ofcontrolling
risks are employed with an emphasis that variesconsiderably
according to the activity. Whether I run to catcha bus and
perhaps collide with someone in the process will be influ-
enced more by the possibility ofmy liability than by any
prior regulation of my behavior;2 and similarly, forexample,
with how I choose to fell a tree inmy backyard when there
is a chance that it would strike the roof ofmy neighbor's
garage. But whether I drive my truck through a tunnel when2
carrying a load of explosives, whether I mark exits to be
used in case of fire in my store, whether an electric utility
incorporates certain safety features into the design of a
nuclear power plant--such decisions will often be determined
substantially by regulation.
What leads society sometimes to rely primarily on
liability to reduce risks and other times on regulation?
When is it socially desirable to employ one means of control
and when the other? These are the questions to be addressed
here. In considering them, the instrumentalist, economic
method of analysis will be used. That is, the effects on
behavior of liability and of regulation will be compared and
then evaluated on a utilitarian basis, given that parties
can be expected to act in their self_interest.2a
The plan of the article will first be to identify four
general determinants of the relative social desirability of
liability and of regulation. Then it will be suggested that
in light of these determinants, the choices observed to be
made between the two approaches for controlling risk are,
when very broadly viewed, socially rational: Notably,
activities that create the risk of the typical tort (the
tree falling on my neighbor's garage) and that are little
regulated characteristically display features which would
lead us to say that they ought to be controlled mainly by
liability. And activities that are much regulated --espe-
cially ones involving significant hazards to health or to
the environment --oughtto be directly constrained in important3
ways, taking into account their usual features. Following
this, several qualifying remarks will be made ina brief
concluding section and the possibility of extending the
analysis to a broader consideration of the control riskthat
would include the use of fines and injunctions willbe
noted.4
II. Theoretical Determinants of the Desirability of
ity and of Regulation of Safety
In discussing the factors that will be claimed to pre-
dispose society toward reliance on liability or on regulation
to control risk, it will be convenient to consider a measure
of social welfare depending on the value of engaging in
risky activities, the difficulties and expense involved in
reducing risks, the harms that occur, and the administrative
costs associated with the use of liability and of regulation.3
These variables, then, will be seen as deciding whether and
at what level it would be socially desirable that parties
engage in risky activities, the steps that should be taken
to reduce risks, and the best use of liability and of regu-
lation. With this in mind the determinants will now be
examined.
The four determinants. The determinant of initial
concern is the possibility of a difference in knowledge
about risky activities possessed by private parties and by a
regulatory authority. The difference in knowledge might be
over the value of parties' activities, the costs of reducing
risks, or the probability or magnitude of risks.
If the private parties possess information about these
elements that is superior to the regulatory authority's,
then, other things equal, it would be desirable for it to be
the parties who perform the calculations to decide how to
control risks. Thus there would appear to be an advantage5
in the use of liability. Conversely, if the authority
possesses the better information, the social advantage would
seem to lie in the direction of use of regulation.
To be more precise about the nature of this argument,
consider the situation where private partiespossess perfect
information about a risky activity and the regulatory author-
ity has only imperfect knowledge about it. Then under
regulation, if the authority would overestimate the potential
for harm, it would set too stringent a standard, and likewise
if it would underestimate the value of the activity or the
cost of reducing risk. On the other hand, if the regulatory
authority would make the reverse errors, it would announce a
standard that is lax.
Under the approach of liability, however, the outcome
would likely be better. That this would be so is readily
seen if liability were strict—-if parties had to pay for
losses caused regardless of their fault--for then they would
be motivated to balance the true costs of reducing risk
against the true benefits in terms of expected savings in
losses caused. Now assume that the form of liability is the
negligence rule--under which parties are held responsible
for harm only if their level of care falls short of a level
of "due" care--and suppose that the courts would acquire
enough information if harm were done from learning about the
nature of the incident in question to be able to formulate
the appropriate level of due care. Then the parties, anti-
cipating this, would in principle be led to exercise that6
level of care.4 The situation is altered of course if the
courts are not assumed to be able to acquire sufficient
information to determine an appropriate standard of due
care; but the situation would still be superior to that
under regulation if the information which the courts would
normally obtain in the event of harm would be better than
that which a regulatory authority would be capable of bring-
ing to bear ex ante.
(In the case where it is the regulatory authority that
possesses the superior information, an argument can obviously
be given in favor of regulation analogous to the one in
favor of liability that was just discussed.)
Having identified how a difference in knowledge about
risk affects the relative desirability of liability and of
regulation, the question must be asked what differences in
knowledge would actually be expected to exist. As a general
matter, the answer would seem to be that private parties
should enjoy an inherent advantage in knowledge in virtue of
their position. They, after all, are the ones who are
engaging in and deriving benefits from their activities; as
a kind of byproduct of this, they should know quite a lot
about the nature of the risks created, the costs of reducing
the risks, and changes in the risks or in the costs of
reducing them.5 Similarly, it would seem that the courts
ought usually to have an advantage in knowledge over a
regulatory authority; one would expect the courts to be
•better able to adjust the due care standard on the basis of
particular sets of facts adduced by private parties who have7
caused harm than a regulatory authority would be able to
individualize its prior standards of behavior.6
Yet this is not to say that private parties (or the
courts) would necessarily possess information superior to
that of a regulatory authority, for in certain contexts
information of significance about risk or its reduction is
not an obvious byproduct of engaging in risky activity but
rather requires effort to develop or special expertise to
evaluate. Where this is so, the regulatory authority might
possess the superior information7 and, further, be unable to
communicate it easily to private parties because for instance
of its technical aspect. Thus, a case can be made forwhy
the regulatory authority mightpossess better information
than private parties' and not transmit it to them,even if
the usual expectation would be for the parties topossess
the superior information.
The second determinant of interest is that private
parties might be incapable of paying for the full magnitude
of harm done. To the extent that this isso, potential
liability would not furnish an adequate incentive to reduce
risk. Specifically, such would be the case becauseliability
exceeding a party's assets would be seen by him only as
liability equal to his assets; thus the party's motive to
reduce risk would be less than society's.8
But under the regulatory approach possible incapacity
to pay for harm done would be a matter of irrelevance, for8
parties would be made to take steps to reduce risk as a
precondition for engaging in their activities.9
Of course, in assessing the importance of this argument
in favor of regulation over liability, a variety of consid-
erations needs to be taken into account: most obviously,
the size of parties' assets in relation to the chances of
various magnitudes of harm; in addition, the voluntary or
required purchase of liability insurance and its effects on
behavior; and further, the type of private party--whether a
large enterprise as opposed to an individual or to a several-
person firm. The latter considerations bear comment.
Regarding liability insurance, it should first be
observed that a party's motive to purchase coverage against
having to pay damages substantially exceeding his assets
will be a diminished one. This is because the purchase of
such coverage is in effect the purchase of protection against
losses which the party would otherwise have to bear only in
small part)-0 Thus the party may well decide against the
purchase of coverage much exceeding his assets, meaning that
the argument under consideration in favor of regulation
would be essentially unaffected.
If, however, the party does decide to purchase coverage
against liability significantly exceeding his assets or is
required by statute to do so, the question that needs to be
asked is what his incentive to take care would then be. And
the answer depends on whether insurers can easily determine
risk-reducing behavior and link the premium charged (or the
conditions of coverage) to such behavior. If this can be9
done, then the motive of insureds to take care should be
tolerably good; but if insurers find it difficult to verify
efforts at risk-reduction and do not do so, then the motive
of insureds to take care may be insufficient, and plausibly
lower than if they did not own coverage) Accordingly, the
problem of the inadequacy of the incentive to reduce risk
that would exist were parties uninsured and unable topay
fully for harm done may either be mitigated or exacerbated
by their purchase of liability insurance.
With respect now to the other consideration, concerning
the type of private party, what is of special interest is
the situation where the party is a large firm; for the
activities of a large firm are prone to result in large
liabilities, and although the firm may have assets sufficient
to cover them, individuals within the firm often will not.
In consequence, the firm's ability to induce its decision-
makers to reduce the risk of corporate liability by the
threat of recovery from them or by imposition of penalties
of its own devise may be limited, and this in turnmay
increase the appeal of regulation.2
The third general determinant of the relative desirabi-
lity of liability and of regulation is that parties might
not face the threat of suit for harm done. Such a possibil-
ity clearly means that liability might not result in proper
incentives to reduce risk, whereas it would be of no import
under regulation.10
The relevance of this determinant favoring regulation
depends on the presence of causes of failure to bring suit.
One of these causes is the chance of dispersal of harm over
many victims, making it less than worthwhile for any par-
ticular victim to initiate legal action. (However, in
certain contexts- the victims' opportunity to employ the
device of the class action limits the importance of this as
a problem for liability.) A second cause of failure to
bring suit is the passage of a long period of time before
harm eventuates. This raises the possibility that by the
time suit could be brought, the evidence necessary for a
successful action would be stale or that the responsible
parties would be defunct. And a third source of victims'
failure to bring suit is difficulty in attributing harm to
responsible parties. This problem may arise for reasons
ranging from simple ignorance that a harm could have been
caused by another party (as opposed to being "natural" in
origin), to inability to make other than rough guesses about
the role played by numerous other parties of varying descrip-
tion, to the impossibility of saying which among a fairly
well-defined group of parties caused the loss.13
In addition, a point about large firms analogous to the
one made two paragraphs above should be mentioned. Namely,
even if harms can be linked to the actions of firms and suits
successfully brought, the effect of the prospect of suit on
the behavior of decisionmakers within firms may be slight;
with the passage of time, for example, there might be no11
clear way of identifying whichamong the employees of the
firm were the responsible parties; and theresponsible
parties might no longer be working at their firms. In other
words, the problem that decisionjnakers might not face the
threat of suit or some other penalty for harm donemay still
exist at one remove.
The last general determinant of interest is themagni-
tude of the various administrative costs incurred private
parties and y the public in connection with use of the
legal system and with regulation.14
In this regard, it is tentatively suggested that there
is an underlying advantage in favor ofliability, for under
liability administrative costs are borne only if harmoccurs.
Thus, if harm is unlikely, administrative costs will be low.
If the possibility of some harm is eliminated becauseof the
deterrent effect of liability, then no administrativecosts
will be borne; in effect, the reduction of that riskof harm
will have been accomplished for free. Underregulation, on
the other hand, administrative costs are incurredwhether or
not harm occurs; even if the risk of a harm is eliminatedby
regulation, administrative Costs will have been borne in the
process.
In evaluating the importance of this point,one factor
that needs to be taken into account is thata systematic
difference may exist between the administrativecosts borne
per instance of enforcement of regulation and per instance12
of use of the liability system. This factor may work either
to reinforce or to diminish or offset the initial advantage
of liability. A second factor of relevance, and one which
tends to enhance the advantage of liability, is that even
when an accident occurs, often there will not be a suit or
litigation.14a
A third factor, but working in favor of regulation, is
that determining adherence to regulatory requirements need
not involve verification with certainty; administrative
costs may be lowered by use of probabilistic methods of
enforcement).4b There is, however, a bound to the savings
that can be achieved by this strategy, at least because
there is a minimum frequency of verification that must be
maintained to induce parties' adherence to a regulation.15
And a fourth factor of relevance is the desirability
that administrative costs be "focused" on controlling the
group of parties most likely to cause harm. This occurs
naturally under liability just because administrative costs
are incurred only for parties who actually cause harm.(The
population of these parties is comprised of a larger fraction
of the group most likely to cause harm than is the original
population of all parties engaged in the risky activity.)
On the other hand, there is no such favorable tendency under
regulation, all the parties being equally subject to verifi-
cation procedures in the absence of special information
about their category of risk.13
Summary. The discussion to this point may be summarized
as follows: that (i) to the extent private partiespossess
information about risky activities which issuperior to a
regulatory authority's, the desirability of allowing the
parties to decide how to reduce risk will be enhanced, and
thus, so will be the appeal of the liability approachover
the regulatory; that (ii) the problem ofinability to pay
for the full magnitude of harm done reduces the deterrent
inherent in liability and is therefore anargument in favor
of regulation; that (iii) the likelihood that suit wouldnot
be brought is for similar reasons a factor that works in
favor of regulation; that (iv) consideration of adndnistra-
tive costs may favor liability because under it andnot
under regulation, such costs are borne only if harmactually
occurs; but this argument was qualified in several ways.
Joint use of liability and of regulation. To conclude
this section, it should be observed that the determinants
favoring liability and those favoring regulation ought both
generally to have enough importance to make desirable some
degree of use of each means of controlling risk. Consider-
ation of the four determinants is therefore to beregarded
as determining the best balance between liability andregula-
tion, not which approach ought to be employed to the exclu-
sion of the other.
If, then, some measure of jointness of use of liability
and regulation is likely to be advantageous, whatcan be1.4
saidabout the two questions that are immediately raised
concerning the relationship between satisfaction of regula-
tion and liability? That is, should a party's adherence to
regulation relieve him of liability? And on the other hand,
should a party's failure to satisfy regulatory requirements
result necessarily in his liability?
Theory suggests that the answer to both these questions
ought to be in the negative. In respect to the first, if
satisfaction of regulatory requirements were to render
parties immune from liability, then none would do more than
to satisfy the requirements. But there will generally be
parties who ought to do more to reduce risk than what is
called for by regulation because they bear lower than usual
costs of taking care or present a higher than usual poten-
tial for doing harm, or because there are aspects of their
behavior which affect risk but are not covered by regulation
(due to limitations of knowledge on the part of the regula-
tory authority). And since some among these parties would
be induced by liability to take more care to reduce risk
(for some would be able to pay for harm done and would be
sued with sufficiently high likelihood), it becomes desirable
to employ liability as an additional means of controlling
risk.16
At the same time, if failure to satisfy regulation were
necessarily to result in a party's liability for negligence,
then some parties would be inappropriately led to satisfy
regulation who would not otherwise have done so. This is15
because some parties for whom theregulatory requirements
would not be desirable--those facing higher thanusual costs
of care or posing less than the usualpotential for harm--will
not have been forced to satisfy the requirementsdue to
flaws in or probabilistic methods ofregulatory enforcement.
Yet these parties might still be inducedby threat of liabil-
ity to obey the requirements. But allowingrecognition in
liability law of the parties' special circumstances will
lead, desirably, to their not adhering to theregulatory
requirements after all)716
III. Activities Controlled Mainly by Liability; the Typical
Tort.
It will be suggested now that there exists a rough
consistency between the theoretically desirable use of
liability and of regulation and their use in fact. In
arguing thus, attention will be focused in this part on
activities which are controlled mainly by liability; and for
concreteness, reference will often be made to the two acti-
vities mentioned earlier--to my chopping down the tree that
might fall on a neighbor's garage; or to my running to catch
a bus and possibly colliding with someone in so doing. It
will be seen by examining in turn the four determinants that
such activities as these ought to be controlled primarily by
liability, that the drawbacks of regulation would probably
be acute.
Consider first the determinant concerning the possession
of information about risk. When one thinks about this
matter in some detail, one comes to believe that private
parties would, as suggested above, know more, and much more,
than a regulatory authority. I would likely know signifi-
cantly more than an authority about the danger involved in
felling a tree in my backyard and the costs of reducing the
danger because I would know the position of this particular
tree relative to my neighbor's particular garage; how diffi-
cult it would be to lower risk by use of guy wires; or how
time consuming it would be to cut down the tree in stages.17
Similarly, I would know more than an authority about the
chance of knocking someone down when running fora bus at
this particular speed at that particularcorner; and how
hard it would be to take greater care in running for thebus
and the consequences of failing to catch it.
The reason -why I, or, private parties willusually have
much more information than a regulatory authority aboutthe
risks associated with tortious activities and thecost of
reducing them is evidently that this information will truly
be a byproduct of engaging in the activities and becausethe
conditions determining the nature of risks will beso various
and subject to changing circumstance.
As a consequence of the superiority of private parties'
information, it seems that reasonably satisfactory decisions
should be made under liability, whereas costly mistakes
would be unavoidable under regulation. Werea regulatory
authority to set forth rules concerning the felling of trees
in backyards and the proper pursuit of buses, it isa surety
that the rules would sometimes be too restrictive.In
instances where it would be safe to chop downmy tree or to
hurry after a bus, I might be required by regulation to take
needless precautions—-precautions which I would not takeon
account only of my potential liability.Conversely, it is
plain that the authority's rules standing alone wouldsome-
times be insufficiently demanding; I might find itvery easy
to take a precaution in chopping down a tree thatwas not
required by regulation; only because of a concern forliability18
would I be led to take the precaution. It does thus appear
that behavior under regulation often would be much inferior
to that resulting from liability on account of a regulatory
authority's relative lack of information.
Consider now the second determinant, that of ability to
pay for harm done. Here, admittedly, there is a potential
problem; there will frequently be some possibility that a
party will not be able to pay for harm done. Nevertheless,
this does not seem to be an issue of great significance in
respect to many of the activities of present interest. If
my tree falls and damages my neighbor's garage, it is rea-
sonably likely that I will be able to pay what is necessary
to repair it; if I own or rent a house, I should probably
have assets plus liability insurance sufficient to cover
damage to the garage. While inability to pay for harm done
is conceded to be a factor reducing the deterrent of liabil-
ity in respect to the typical tort, it does not stand out as
a problem of unusual dimension (at least by comparison to
many of the situations discussed in the following part of
the article).
Next, consider the likelihood that suit would be brought
for harm done. This likelihood appears to be relatively
high for the typical tort, as none of the reasons given for
failure to bring suit would usually seem to apply. In
particular, the dispersal of harm over manyvictimsis not a19
characteristic of the typical tort; whenmy tree falls, it
might damage the property of one, notmany neighbors; when I
run for a bus, I am unlikely to collide withmore than one
or two individuals. Similarly, thepassage of a long period
of time between an injurer's action and theoccurrence of
harm is not a feature of the typicaltort; rather the harm
that I might do in chopping downmy tree or running for a
bus will be direct and immediate; for theusual tort, the
injurer's action will be quickly followedby harmful conse-
quences if there are to be any. The other possiblecause of
failure to bring suit was the chance that harmwould not be
attributable to a responsible party, and,again, there does
not seem to be any special difficulty inrespect to the
usual tort; if my tree falls onmy neighbor's garage, he
will know what did the harm. Insum, then, none of the
reasons for failure to bring suit shouldusually be of
significance in situations presenting the risk ofthe typical
tort and, hence, do not constitute anargument for regulation.
Regarding, finally, the determinant of administrative
costs, consider the interpretation of whatwas said in
Part II. The initial point was thatliability should have
an underlying cost advantage because we wouldexpect it to
be less expensive for society to bearadministrative costs
only in the event of harm than independent of theoccurrence
of harm. The relevance of this point doesseem to be con-
firmed by our examples; one does have theimpression that it20
would be significantly less costly for society to incur
administrative costs only when falling trees happen to
descend on garage roofs or only when individuals running for
buses happen to collide with others--fairly unlikely events--
than for society to formulate and enforce regulations con-
cerning whether trees are chopped down and how so, and
whether individuals may walk only at a normal pace to catch
a bus or may be allowed to hurry after it.18 Indeed, when
one stops to think about it, virtually all our entirely
routine activities (walking, mowing a lawn, playing catch)
are seen to be, like the examples, perfectly innocuous in
the overwhelming majority of instances. Thus the savings
over regulation that are realized under liability on account
of the limitation of administrative costs to those numerically
few occasions when harm is done must be great.
(The notion of effective regulation of the activities
of everyday life even seems fanciful to contemplate. Perhaps
this is because it would be made particularly difficult by
the necessity of frequent and likely intrusive verification
procedures; for what would usually need to be determined by
a regulatory authority are aspects of readily modifiable
individual behavior rather than the presence of "fixed"
physical objects. )19
Last, the earlier noted tendency for administrative
costs to be concentrated under liability on those most
likely to cause harm can also be seen to be of relevance; it
makes sense to believe there will be a much higher propor—21
tion of awkward individualsamong the group who succeed in
knocking down others when running for buses thanamong the
group of all those who chase after buses; and it would be a
waste to monitor the behavior of themany relatively agile
individuals in the latter group who do notcause accidents,
but that is what would be done under theregulatory approach.
Let us now summarize our review of the determinants.
We first argued that a reasonably strong case exists in
favor of liability due to the likely superiority ofknowledge
of private parties over a regulatoryauthority's; and we
just argued that a strong case for liability results from
consideration of savings in administrative costs;we thought
that only a moderate advantage of regulation exists in
connection with parties' inability topay for harm done; and
we saw no real reason to believe that there would besystematic
failure of victims to bring suit and thusno advantage of
regulation arising in that regard. Taking these fourargu-
ments into account--the two working strongly in favor of
liability, the one working with only some force against it,
and the other of little relevance--the conclusion isthat
liability ought to be employed and that regulationought not
to be much used in controlling the risk of thetypical tort.
The theoretically desirable solution to the controlof this
familiar category of risk is thus seen as consistent with
the solution observed in practice.22
IV. Activities Controlled in Significant Ways by Regulation
It will be the aim here to demonstrate by examining
again the four determinants that it is desirable that society
resort to safety regulation where it does--in controlling
the risks of fire, the production and sale of many foods and
drugs, the generation of pollutants, and the transport and
use of explosives and other dangerous materials. The claim,
in other words, will be that regulation in these areas is no
coincidence but rather is needed because liability alone
would not result in adequate reduction of risks and because
the usual disadvantages of regulation are not so serious, or
at least are outweighed by its advantages.
Consider first the determinant concerning information
about risk. Here it appears that what typifies much regula-
tion is that its requirements can fairly reliably be justi-
fied by common knowledge or something close to it. Presumably,
most of us would agree that it is well worthwhile for explo-
sives to be transported over routes that avoid the drastic
risk of explosions in tunnels; that expenditures on highly
strong elevator cables are warranted by the resulting reduc-
tion in the probability of fatal accidents; that expen-
ditures on pasteurization of milk are made desirable by the
decreased chances of bacterial contamination. In such
examples as these, it seems that the regulatory authority
can be reasonably confident that its requirements are justi-
fied in the great majority of situations. This is not to23
say, of course, that they will be justified in all situations.
There will obviously be some occasions when milk willbe
consumed soon enough that failure to pasteurize itwould
lead to no real risk. But these occasions willbe few in
number, and the error due to inappropriateregulation will
accordingly be small.
In addition, even where this argument does notapply--
because the design of appropriate regulationrequires much
more than common knowledge--it may still be true that the
regulatory authority enjoys an informational advantage.
This situation perhaps obtains inrespect to certain health-
related and environmental risks for whichexpert medical,
epidemiological, or ecological knowledge is needed for
proper assessment. Small firms using toxic substances, for
instance, could well be thought to know little about andto
have a limited capacity to understand the risksthey create,
and the same might sometimes be true oflarge firms. The
reason that this possibility arises is that itmay be uneco-
nomic for firms individually to develop and maintainexpert
knowledge about toxic substances; theremay be economies of
scale involved in the acquisition ofknowledge about the
substances and external benefits associated with itmaking a
regulatory authority or a governmentalagency the more
logical entity for the purpose of securing the knowledge.20
(Nevertheless, it is hardly claimed that this willusually
be the case in areas where substantiallymore than common
knowledge is needed to determine regulatoryrequirements.)24
Let us now consider the second of the four determi-
nants, ability to pay for harm done. This determinant seems
to be of general value in explaining why we regulate the
activities that we do, for these activities frequently
create risks which can readily be imagined to exceed the
assets of responsible parties. Injury due to fire at a
nightclub or hotel, for example, could clearly result in
larger losses than the assets of its owner; the harm caused
by mass consumption of spoiled food or by inoculation with
vaccines with adverse side-effects could easily surpass the
assets of a packager of food or a drug company; the losses
caused by explosions, oil spills, chemical pollutants,
radioactive or other carcinogenic substances could with not
insubstantial probability exceed the assets of even the
largest corporations. It is thus apparent that in many
areas of regulation, potential liability could well be
larger than the assets of an involved firm (certainly of the
personal assets of any of its employees) and therefore that
the deterrent effect of liability alone would not result in
adequate reduction of risk.
Consider next the determinant concerning the likelihood
of being sued for harm done. As a brief reconsideration of
the factors that lead to failure to bring suit will demon-
strate, this determinant seems to be of significance in
explaining the regulation of a wide class of environmental
and health-related risks. First, many environmental and25
health-related risks evidently are sufficientlydispersed
that it is not worth victims' while tobring suit on an
individual basis. Second,many such risks often take a long
time to eventuate. This is both because harmfulagents may
not produce adverse effects untilyears after their intro-
duction into host bodies and because theagents may retain
their potency for extended periods. As aconsequence, and
as remarked generally earlier, by the time harm occurs the
evidence necessary to bring a successful actionmay be hard
to develop, responsible individualsmay have separated from
their firms or have died, and firms themselvesmay have gone
out of business. Third and last, environmental and health-
related risks frequently have the characteristic that when
they occur, it is difficult to attribute them to a particular
firm or to a particular cause. This in turn is truefor a
variety of reasons: as just mentioned, the time that it
takes for risks to eventuate; the often complex and incom-
pletely understood nature of the risks; and the fact that
the risks are sometimes truly due to more thanone cause.
Thus, it indeed seems to be the case that environmental and
health-related risks often do not result in anappropriately
high potential liability burden to the firms that caused
them; and that even where this is not so, the responsible
individuals within the firms may not face anappropriate
chance of incurring liability or of bearinga sanction
internal to the firm. In either event,therefore, the
rationality of use of regulation is suggested.26
Consider, finally, the determinant of administrative
costs. As explained before, there may be an underlying cost
advantage in favor of liability, but two qualifying factors
were mentioned. One was the cost per instance of verifying
adherence to regulation. And this, we indicated earlier,
should typically be lower when regulation requires the
presence of particular things (fire extinguishers, guard
rails, life boats) than when it requires adoption of particu-
lar modes of behavior, and much regulation requires the
former. Moreover, even when regulation concerns modes of
behavior, the cost of verifying adherence may relatively be
low if there is little chance of concealment of the behavior.
How easy would it be, for instance, for a dairy to keep
secret its failure to pasteurize milk given the ease with
which a sample could be tested, the large number of employees
who would be aware of the firmts practices, and so forth?
The other qualifying factor noted was the possibility of
reducing monitoring costs by use of probabilistic methods of
enforcement. In this regard, it need only be said that such
methods of determining compliance with regulations are often
employed. Thus, the administrative costs of verification of
adherence to regulation per instance appear sometimes actually
to be low; while if not, at least some savings are realized
by use of probabilistic means of enforcement.
At this point, having discussed the four determinants
in relation to activities that are regulated in significant27
ways, the claim of consistency withtheoryshould seem
plausible. For most such activities, the two affirmative
arguments for regulation--the problem of inability to pay
for harm done, and the possibility of failure to bring
suit--should seem to outweigh the two potential disadvantages
of regulation--the lack of information of the regulator and
the size of administrative costs. (It is clear from what we
have said, however, that the relative importance of the
different arguments may vary according to the activity; thus
our statement must be carefully interpreted.21)
The general claim of consistency of the theory with the
choice society has made over which activities to regulate is
given further support by consideration of the "second-order"
choices society has made over which aspects of a regulated
activity to subject to regulation and which not. While to
reduce the risks due to fire there may be requirements
concerning the display of exit signs or the installation of
smoke alarms and sprinkler systems, there will inevitably be
many routine practices that affect the risk of fire and
which will not be regulated (e.g., whether to store flammable
furniture polish in a closet through which a heating pipe
passes). These unregulated aspects of risk appear usually
to have the feature that it would involve great expense for
the regulatory authority to enforce its standard (ensure
that polish is kept out of the closet), or that the appro-
priate standard would be hard for the authority to determine28
because of the highly contextual nature of the information
that would be needed (type of polish, surface temperature of
heating pipe). In other words, the two advantages of ha-
bility--savings in administrative costs, and allowing parties
to make decisions based on their superior information--seem
to help explain -what aspects of a regulated activity are
left unregulated.
Finally, the claim of consistency of the theory with
what is true in fact is confirmed also by the agreement
between the theoretically desirable and the observed rela-
tionship between satisfaction of regulation and imposition
of liability. Specifically, it is indeed the case that
adherence to regulation does not necessarily relieve a party
of liability.22 Moreover, when liability is found despite
adherence to regulation, the reason given is frequently
phrased in terms of there being "unusual circumstances" or
"increased danger," which is what we said theory suggests
ought to give rise to liability despite satisfaction of
regulation.23 On the other hand, it is also true that
failure to satisfy regulatory requirements does not auto-
matically result in liability.24 And the explanation that
is often furnished in this regard, that a party's "violation
of the [statutory] law" does not imply his negligence if the
"circumstances" justify an apparent disobedience, again
comports with theory.2529
V.Concluding Comments
(a) While it was the claim in the
last two parts that the theoretical determinants discussed
initially serve to explain the observed use of regulation of
safety and of liability, it was stated several times that
this is believed to be true only in an approximatesense.
It is hardly thought that the use of the twomeans of con-
trolling risk, when inspected in a detailedway, will uni-
formly seem rational in light of the theory presented here
(or of any other simple theory).
Indeed,one not infrequently encounters the view that
mistakeshave been made in the use of regulation and liability.
On the one hand, one sometimes hears it said thatregulation
is inadequate. Consider for example the claim thatthere
has been insufficient control over the disposal of toxic
wastes. This claim might well have merit: For at least
until recently, the disposal of toxic wasteswas little
regulated, while the threat of liability probably provided
an insufficient deterrent against improper disposal --due
to manifold problems of establishing causation and of the
possibility that the harm done would exceed the assets of
responsible parties.26 On the other hand, one of course
hears it asserted that certain regulation isunduly con-
straining. It is commonly argued, for instance, that various
O.S.H.A. requirements and antipollution standardsare too
standardized or impose excessive costs on industry.2730
That there should be examples of apparent social irra-
tionality is really to be expected, for the choices actually
made concerning regulation are obviously influenced by a
multitude of factors lying outside our framework of analysis
(notably, the pressures of interest groups27a), and, in any
event, often will not reflect conscious, careful use of a
social cost-benefit calculus. Moreover, the complexity of
therelationshipbetween liability and regulation, the
possibilities for modification of the liability system as an
alternative to use of regulation, and the many unanswered
empirical questions supply further reasons to expect errors
(relative to an ideal) to have been made.
(b) The theoretical determinants used here to analyze
the choice between regulation and liability would be of
relevance as well to a more complete assessment of the
relative social desirability of alternative methods for
controlling risk, and in particular, to one considering the
use of fines for harm done28 and of injunctions. It therefore
seems worthwhile indicating what would probably be the major
points of such an assessment.
Consider first the use of a fine. This method of
controlling behavior is identical to liability in the respect
that it creates an incentive toward reduction of risk which
works through parties paying for the harm they turn out to
do. Thus, the fine enjoys essentially the same advantages
as liability --theprivate parties balance the costs of31
reducing risks against the benefits; and society bears
administrative costs only when harm is done. Also, the fine
suffers from similar disadvantages --inabilityto pay for
harm would dilute the effect of itsuse, as would the possi-
bility that the fine would not be levied.
But the fine differs from liability in that it is
public in nature; a private party does not institute the
fine and does not benefit financially when it iscollected,
a public agency does. The principal implication of this
difference is perhaps that the likelihood of collection of
the fine may differ from the likelihood aparty would be
sued. In most contexts, one supposes that this difference
would work against the fine; as private parties wouldusually
know better than a public agency when harm occurred and
might profit from bringing or threatening suit but not from
informing a public agency of harm so that it could impose a
fine, the likelihood of suit would be higher than that ofa
fine.29 Nevertheless,there are circumstances in which the
advantage would lie in the other direction: where a suit
would not be brought because of difficulty inestablishing
causation under the usual tort principles, the fine could
still be imposed; and similarly where privateparties are
unaware of the harm or it is too dispersed to make legal
action worthwhile.3° Finally, another difference between
the fine and liability is in the size of administrative
costs. This difference, one speculates, might workagainst
liability as a general matter, assuming that its use is
procedurally more complex than that of the fine.32
With regard now to the injunction, observe that it
resembles regulation of safety in that it works in a direct
way to control risk; the injunction prevents harm simply by
proscribing certain behavior. Hence, the injunction shares
advantages similar to those of safety regulation: the use
of the injunction is in no way impeded by the possibility
that a party would not be able to pay for the harm he does,31
or by the chance that the harm would be highly dispersed or
difficult to attribute to him under tort principles.32
The injunction differs from safety regulation, however,
in that it is employed at the urging of private parties.
This would seem to offer an advantage over safety regulation
where the private parties have better information about the
nature of potential harm. Still, the fact that the injunc-
tion is brought by private parties would amount to a disad-
vantage where they would not have superior information about
potential harm, or where, because the harm would be of a
general nature and spread over many parties, they would not
find it individually worthwhile to take legal action and
would face difficulties in coordinating a collective action.Footnotes
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A formal version of the main argument of this article
is made in my Harm as a Prerequisite for Liability,
Harvard University, 1979, and in A Model of the Socially
Optimal Use of Liability and Regulation, Harvard Law
School, 1983. The present article will provide the
basis for a chapter in the part on torts of a book A
Theoretical Analysis of Law on which I am at work.
1. Of course, liability and regulation might be viewed as
serving purposes distinct from the control of risk;
notably, liability might be seen as a means of compen-
sating those who have suffered harm, and regulation as
reflecting in part the influence of interest groups.
In the interest of clarity, however, this article will
abstract from functions of liability and regulation
other than the control of risk. (But see note 3,
infra.)
la. As the chief goal here is to compare liability and
regulation, there will be no explicit attempt to identify
the extent to which the conclusions reached may be
separately attributed to the first dimension in whichfn-2
the approaches differ (employed only after harm is done
vs. before) or to the second dimension (employed at the
initiative of private parties vs. of a public agency).
Neither will there be an attempt to discuss other
approaches to controlling risk, except, as will be
indicated, in the concluding comments.
2.This is hardly to deny that I would try to avoid col-
liding with someone for reasons independent of the fear
of legal sanctions, but, again for expositional con-
venience, in analyzing parties' behavior here, attention
will be limited to the legal consequences of acts.
2a. This is the general approach adopted by two influential
legal scholars in their analysis of the problem of
accidents; see Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents,
1970, and Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law,
(2nd ed.) 1977, Chapter 6.
3.The reason that the compensatory objective is excluded
is not that it is thought unimportant but rather that
the objective does not appear to bear significantly on
the subject of the article. The latter seems the case
because under either the liability approach or the
regulatory, potential victims have the opportunity to
purchase first-party insurance coverage; and if it is
felt that this would not provide them adequate coverage
(perhaps because they would fail to make rational pur-
chase of insurance or because they would not be able
to afford it), the state could always establish a
public insurance program.fn-3
4. See John P. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Lia-
bility, 2 J. Legal Studies 323 (1973).
5.Consideration of the possibility of changes in the
risks or the costs of their reduction suggests that a
private party should have an advantage in knowledge
even if the regulatory authority were assumed able to
assess perfectly accurately his situation at the time
it observed him. Only if the regulatory authority were
presumed to monitor continuously the party's situation
would it possess knowledge equal to the party's.
6. In part, this is because the facts presented to the
courts will often reflect changes in parties' situa-
tions; see note 5, supra.
7. The regulatory authority might possess the superior
information for well knownreasons:First, the authority
(or some governmental agency) might have decided to
commit resources to the acquisition of information
about risk in light of a socially inadequate incentive
of private parties to do so. The incentive of private
parties might be inadequate because of their inability
to appropriate the full social benefits of information
that they develop; others will often learn what they
have discovered and benefit from it without paying
them; see generally Kenneth 3. Arrow, Essays in the
Theory of Risk Bearing, 1971, Chapter 6.
And second, the regulatory authority might be
better suited to acquire information about risk becausefn-4
it requires assembling relatively largegroups of
experts; it would be wasteful and unnecessary for such
groups to be assembled by multiple private parties.
8. See more generally, Steven Shavell, TheJudgment Proof
Problem, Harvard Law School, 1984.
9. In saying this, we are ignoring thepossibility that in
some contexts enforcement of a regulation could itself
become a problem due to parties' low assets.
10. Consider whether a party with assets of $20,000and
facing a potential liability of $100,000 would wish to
buy liability insurance coverage. For the party to
purchase coverage would be for him to purchase protection
against $80,000 of risk which he would not otherwise
bear. This means that his premium forcoverage would
be much higher-- five times so--than what would bethe
premium for the risk of his $20,000 of assets alone.
Hence, the party might well rationally decide against
purchase of coverage (even though he would havepur-
chased coverage if his assets had been as largeas
$100,000). See William Keeton and Evan Kwerel, Exter-
nalities in Automobile Insurance and the Underinsured
Driver Problem, Yale University, 1983; andShavell,
note 8, supra.
11. To illustrate this possibility, consider theparty of
the previous note, suppose that liability insurers
cannot observe anything about his efforts to reduce
risk, and suppose too that he is legallyobligated tofn-5
purchase full coverage of $100,000. Then, being fully
covered (and the premium or policy terms not being
dependent on his behavior), the party will have no
motive whatever to reduce risk. But if he had not been
obligated to buy the coverage and would have decided
against doing so (as explained in the previous note),
he would have had some incentive to reduce risk, for at
least his assets of $20,000 would then have been at
stake. See Shavell, note 8, supra.
12. As it stands, what we have argued is really only that
some form of ex ante control of a firm's decisionmakers
may be socially desirable. But the firm itself might
be expected to employ ex ante controls to reduce its
corporate liability where ex post sanctions would be
unsatisfactory. (If a firm's potential liability is
$1,000,000 and the relevant decisionmaker's assets are
only $50,000, then the firm would wish to control
directly his behavior to lower the risk of incurring
the $1,000,000 in liability; as the decisionmaker's
potential loss is far lower, the firm would not wish to
rely solely on the prospect of an ex post sanction to
induce the decjsjonmaker to act so as to avoid corporate
liability). Thus, to complete our argument that the
limited assets of firms' decisionmakers may constitute
an argument in favor of regulation, we must demonstrate
that regulation would often be expected to be superior
to ex ante controls imposed by the firm.fn-6
To this end, consider first "managerial" decision-
makers, by which we mean individuals whose activities
are overseen only by the board of directors and the
shareholders——and thus not by superiors within the
firm. Now the board of directors and the shareholders
would not be -likely to know as much as a regulatory
authority about the nature of risks facing the firm,
for it is implausible that they would have the time or
the necessary expertise to devote to this matter. Thus
the suspicion is that the regulatory authority would
enjoy an informational advantage in controlling the
behavior of managerial decisionmakers.
However, in regard to "line" decisionmakers, those
whose activities are overseen by superiors within the
firm, this argument becomes problematic; for the natural
presumption would be that the superiors within the firm
would have better information than a regulatory author-
ity about the nature of the risks confronted by the
line decisiorunakers. Nevertheless, that will not
always be true, and it will sometimes be cheaper and
more practical for a regulatory authority to enforce
controls than for management to do this.(A harbor
authority would be likely to know more about the risks
at its port than would the management of a shipping
company, and, further, be able to regulate docking
procedures of the company's ships more cheaply than
management due to economies of scale.) In addition,fn-7
and perhaps more important, the incentive of management
to regulate the behavior of line decisionmakers may be
inadequate due to the very problem that a managerial
decisiorinaker's potential liability might be less than
the firm's. Hence, it seems plausible that a regulatory
authority would sometimes be expected to control in a
more desirable way line decisionmakers than would the
firm itself.
For a general discussion of closely related issues,
see Christopher Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability
in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 Yale L. J. 1
(1980); and see also Lewis Kornhauser, An Economic
Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal
Liability for Accidents, 70 Calif. L.R. 1345 (1982).
13. Discussion of modifications of the tort system which
would alleviate this problem of attribution--notably,
imposing liability in proportion to the probability of
causation—-are beyond the scope of this article, On
this matter, see Coimnent, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 963 (1978);
M. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases, forthcoming Harvard L. Rev.; Steven
Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determina-
tion of Civil Liability, Harvard Law School, 1983.
14. The administrative costs associated with use of the
liability system include parties' litigation costs and
other legal expenses, and also the public costs offn-8
conducting trials, employing judges, and so forth.
Similarly, the administrative costs associated with
regulation include parties' costs in proving their
compliance with regulatory requirements (e.g., time
spent completing forms and undergoing inspection by
regulatory officials) and the operating cost of the
regulatory authority.
].4a. That is, the victim either will not threaten legal
action--for lack of a case--or he will do so and will
settle with the other party. Thus, the administrative
costs per accident will frequently, if not usually, be
substantially less than those associated with actual
litigation.
14b. See Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation versus Past Lia-
bility: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring,
6 Journal of Legal Studies 193 (1977), for an analysis
of optimal probabilistic enforcement in a setting
similar to that of this article.
15. Specifically, the minimum frequency of verification
that will induce adherence to regulation exists because,
among other things, there is a definite limit to the
fine that can be imposed for failure to adhere --
namely,the size of the party's assets. And the admin-
istrative costs using even this minimum probability of
verification could easily exceed the administrative
costs associated with liability, for accidents could
occur with arbitrarily small or even with zero proba-fn-9
bility. To illustrate, suppose that the assets of a
party are $10,000; that the costs of taking optimal
care are $500; that regulation calls for spending this
amount; and that spending this amount would entirely
eliminate the possibility of accidents. Then the
minimum probability of verification would be 5% (for
the maximum effective fine of $10,000 times the proba-
bility of verification must exceed $500 to induce the
party to adhere to regulation and to spend the $500).
Hence, the administrative costs of regulation would be
positive. But since under liability the party would
generally be led to spend the $500 and accidents would
therefore not occur, there would be no administrative
costs whatever.
16. To illustrate this point, consider a situation where it
is desirable that most parties, "typical"parties,
spend $500 on care because this will reduce expected
accident losses by $1,000; where a small fraction of
"atypical" parties have the opportunity to reduce
accident losses by an additional $1,000 by spending
$500 more; where such atypical parties cannot be iden-
tified ex ante by the regulatory authority; and where
some fraction of both types of parties have very limited
assets, so that they would not be induced by potential
liability to take care.
In this situation note that the regulatory standard
would of necessity be the same for the typical and thef n]. 0
atypical parties, owing to the assumed lack of informa-
tion of the regulatory authority as to a party's true
opportunity to reduce risk. Observe also that the best
such regulatory standard of care would correspond to
the $500 expenditure, for an expenditure of $1,000
would be appropriate only for the small minority of
atypical parties.
Now if parties were never liable so long as they
adhered to the regulatory requirement that they spend
$500 on care, then the atypical parties would never
spend $1,000, an undesirable outcome. But if there
were a possibility of their liability despite satisfac-
tion of the regulatory requirement, then the atypical
parties with normal assets would, desirably, be led to
spend the additional $500 on care. Thus liability
would serve as a socially beneficial adjunct to regula-
tion.
(Notice also that use of liability alone would be
inferior to the described joint use of regulation and
liability; for use of liability alone would result in
the parties with limited assets (typical or not) taking
no care rather than spending $500.)
17. To illustrate this point, consider the situation described
in note 16, supra, but with the following changes: the
atypical parties are now distinguished by the character-
istic that they would not lower the risk of an accident
at all even by spending the first $500 on care, sofn— 11
their making expenditures on care would be undesirable;
and some fraction of all parties escape the attention
of the regulatory authority.
In this situation, the regulatory standard would
again have to be the same for both types of parties due
to the regulatory authority's inability to tell them
apart, and the best standard would again correspond to
an expenditure of $500 on care, as the atypical parties
are assumed to be so few in number.
Now consider the question whether under the negli-
gence rule an atypical party ought to be found negligent
if he failed to satisfy the regulatory requirement that
he spend $500 on care. This question is relevant of
course because an atypical party might not have been
forced to spend $500 as he might have escaped the atten-
tion of the regulatory authority. Clearly, if such an
atypical party would face no risk of liability for
negligence if he did not spend the $500, then he would
not do so, the desirable result. On the other hand, if
he did face the risk of liability for negligence if he
failed to spend the $500, then he might be led to do
so, an undesirable result. Hence, it is best for the
standard of due care to be relaxed and for atypical
parties to escape liability for negligence despite
their failure to adhere to the regulatory standard of
care.f n- 12
It should perhaps also be stated that this example
illustrates why there is no conundrum represented by
the social "demand" for a certain type of behavior
through announcement of regulatory requirements and yet
the social "acceptance" of different behavior in the
courts' sometimes not finding parties negligent for
failing to comply with the requirements. The social
rationality of this seeming contradiction lies in an
appreciation of the significance of lack of information
for the formulation of optimal regulatory requirements--
the significance being that the requirements should not
be viewed as an unconditional demand but rather as a
demand which, while generally good, ought to be relaxed
if the circumstances warrant it.
18. Suppose that the likelihood of the three which I cut
down striking my neighbor's garage roof is .1%; that
the probability of a dispute over my negligence should
this happen is 50%; that the chance of such a dispute
being settled is 75%; that the administrative cost of a
settlement would be $100; that the chance of a dispute
leading to a trial is 25%; and that the administrative
cost of a trial would be $1,000. Then the likelihood
of a dispute ending in settlement would be .0375% and
that of one resulting in litigation would be .0125%;
hence the expected adminisrative cost associated with
my chopping down the tree would be only .0375%x$lOO +
.0125%x$1,000=$.0375+$.125=$1625.It is hard tofn- 13
imagine that a regulatory authority could, ex ante,
determine compliance with its safety requirements
concerning the felling of my tree for a comparably low
amount.
19. To enforce effectively a regulation concerning an
aspect of behavior which can be modified from one
instance to the next (I can run for the bus tomorrow
even if I do not today) will generally require fairly
frequent monitoring. By contrast, to ensure that a
fixed physical object is in place (strong elevator
cables are installed) will not require very frequent
monitoring (the cables are not going to be replaced
tomorrow).
20. The reader will recall that this point was made more
generally in note 7, supra, but a brief discussion here
of an example may be helpful. Consider the acquisition
of information about the risks associated with use of a
pesticide by firms engaged in the business of extermi-
nation. To determine the nature of these risks using
even existing knowledge as incorporated in professional
medical, public health and other related literature
would require a staff of experts; a several—person
exterminator firm could hardly be expected to undertake
the required literature search, let alone be able to
evaluate and interpret what is in the literature. And
itis of course extremely unlikely that the firm would
engage in research of its own. Moreover, to the argumentf n- 14
that most exterminator firms might jointly and collec-
tively finance efforts to evaluate current knowledge
about the pesticide and to engage in furtherresearch,
two answers can be given. First, it might be hard to
make the firms contribute toward the common pool, for
each might expect to benefit from the group's efforts
regardless of its own contribution (the information
about risk being difficult to restrict to thosemaking
contributions). Second, parties outside the group of
exterminator firms (manufacturers of the pesticide,
farmers who use the pesticide) might generally benefit
from the information about the pesticide risk, meaning
thatthe motive of the exterminator finns to acquire
information about the pesticide might be less than
society's (quite apart from the group's problems in
makingits members contribute to the pool).
21. With regard to health-related and envirorunental risks,
for example, we argued that the likelihood that harm
would not be attributed to responsible parties is an
important consideration favoring use of regulation.
But we made no such suggestion in regard to the risk of
explosions in tunnels or the failure of elevator cables;
we justified regulation of these risks on other grounds.
22. See William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts,
4th ed., 1971, at 203.
23. See Prosser, note 22, supra, 204. Also, at 203, Prosser
writes, "The statutory standard is no more than af n— 15
minimum, and it does not necessarily preclude a finding
that the actor was negligent in failing to take addi-
tional precautions. Thus the requirement of a hand
signal on a left turn does not mean that ... adriver
is absolved from all obligation to slow down, keep a
proper lookout, and proceed with reasonable care."
This statement is in perfect agreement with our expla—
nation from Part II, supra, where we said that the
statutory standard ought to be regarded as a minimum
since there would be parties who ought to take greater
care and would not do so were they to escape liability
on account of complying with the statutory standard.
24. See Prosser, note 22, supra, at 197.
25. See Prosser, note 22, supra, at 198. At 198 and 199,
Prosser writes that "it has been held not to be negli-
gence to violate ... astatute because of physical
circumstances beyond the driver's control, as where his
lights suddenly go out on the highway at night .
Anothervalid excuse is that of emergency, as where one
drives on the left because the right is blocked, or a
child dashes to the street .. ." Suchresults obviously
agree with what we said in Part II; that is, we do not
want the driver to stay on the right side of the road
when the child dashes out; holding him liable for being
on the left would give him a socially undesirable
incentive to drive on the right.f n- 16
26. See, for example, Note, "Allocating the Cost of Hazardous
Waste Disposal," Harvard Law Review 94 (1981) 584 and
references cited therein; Richard A. Epstein, "The
Principles of Environmental Protection: The Case of
the Superfund" Cato Journal 2 (1982) 9; and "Public
Threat Feared in Loopholes in Laws on Toxic Waste
Dumping," p.l, New York Times, June 6, 1983.
27. See, for example, Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its
Reform, Harvard University Press, 1982, Chapter 14;
Albert Nichols and Richard Zeckhauser, Government Comes
to the Workplace: An Assessment of O.S.H.A., The
Public Interest 39 (1977); and for a general introduction
to the issues, Ch. 5 of Richard Stewart and James
Krier, Environmental Law and Policy, Second Edition,
Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1978.
27a. See for example George Stigler, The Economic Theory of
Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. 3 (1971), and SamPeltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. of
Law and Econ. 211 (1976).
28. The type of fine we have in mind is calculated to equal
the harm done; from the perspective of the party who
does harm, therefore, it is as if he is strictly liable.
29. If the tree falls on my neighbor's garage, it is more
likely that he would sue to collect compensation but
that he would report the incident so that I would have
to pay a fine.f n— 17
30. Many environmental and health related harms of course
provide cases in point.
31. This point is made in Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines on Land
Use Controls, 40 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1973).
32. Thus, for example, just as regulation of the safety of
nuclear reactors might be justified by the fact that
incapacity to pay for possible harm would dilute the
deterrent of liability, so could enjoining their opera-
tions in certain circumstances be justified.